Voters Are Accessories To Murder And Other Crimes

By Hans Sherrer

(6-13-2011, revised 8-5-2014)

Authors introductory note. There are various ways to approach analyzing the relationship between the State and the individuals who at any given time are within the geographical area it claims as its jurisdiction. This article takes the approach that if a State (e.g., the United States and each of its fifty member states) is presumed to legally exercise authority as a consequence of the voting process, the voters who participate in any given election can bear criminal responsibility for particular actions that occur under the auspices of one or more of the winning elected officials.

The U.S. has a winners take all electoral system. The winning candidate is considered to represent all of the voters – even those who voted for his or her opponent(s). That is understood by everyone who votes. While there are challenges to the outcome of an election due to voting irregularities, once a winner is officially recognized the authority of the “winner” to act on behalf of (represent) all the voters is legally presumed.

However, the “winner” is also legally considered to represent everyone within the geographical area covered by his or her office. That includes eligible voters who did not vote, under the presumption they waived their right to object by not voting for a different (i.e., a losing) candidate. Everyone ineligible to vote, whether an adult (non-eligible citizens or non-citizens) or a child, is considered represented by the winner under what amounts to a theory of conservatorship. A conservator is defined by the Merriam-Webster’s Dictionary as, “3: an official charged with the protection of something affecting public welfare and interests.” This is applicable to the election process because an elected official is legally considered to represent the interests of every person in their voting district.

Consequently, lawful authority for the winning candidate to act as a representative of the people for their particular office is derived from the people who voted both for and against him or her. The percentage of voters is irrelevant. If 20% of eligible voters vote in an election and the winner receives 10% plus 1 vote – that person is deemed to represent the 90% of eligible voters who didn’t vote for him or her, as well as every other person in their geographical district. Theoretically, a candidate can “win” a political office if the only vote cast in a general election is for him or her. The indispensible key for the holder of a political office to lawfully act is to receive one more vote than any other candidate for the office. In the presidential election one more electoral vote is needed. It is the voting process that is indispensable to bestowing lawfulness to an election and the winning candidate’s authority to act as a representative of the people.

The twin ideas that government in the United States represents the will of the people, and that the people exert their control over the government by electing local, state and national representatives is so deeply imbedded in the psyche of many people that they routinely refer to “our” senator, or president, or governor, or city counsel member, whether they voted for that person, their opponent, didn’t vote, or are ineligible to vote.

Everyone in society is encumbered by what the voters participating in an election decided by at least a one vote margin (or by a tiebreaker procedure). Voters thus bear responsibility for the consequences of a person elected because of their action – since it is the voters who provide the legal basis for the elected person to act in an official capacity as a representative of the people.

Persons empowered to act by voters – from the mayor of a small hamlet to the president of the U.S. – can and do engage in, or authorize others to engage in activities that would land John or Jane citizen in jail or prison if he or she did the same thing, or those illegal activities are conducted under the auspices of their office’s authority for which the elected person bears responsibility.

A mayor, for example, can hire a police chief who either directly allows, turns a blind eye, or allows the cover-up of the mistreatment of a criminal suspect that would result in felony charges against a regular person who committed the same act(s). A president can issue orders that result in the deaths of numerous innocent women, children, and infirm or old people that would result in murder charges if a regular person did the same thing. On a local, state and national level, politicians are involved in the official or quasi-official (wink and nod) authorization of acts that if committed by an individual would be considered criminal, up to and including murder. For example, a private person who enlisted assassins to summarily execute a person could be criminally prosecuted and possibly face the death penalty. President Obama has reportedly authorized the summary execution by drones of a number of people outside the U.S. – including at least one U.S. citizen – who were suspected of being bad people, but who had not been indicted, much less tried or convicted of committing a capital federal crime. A private person who acted like a Mafia Don – or a president– and ordered the summary murder of people would be facing a multitude of grave criminal charges. Yet there is no realistic possibility that President Obama or the underlings involved in his extra-judicial assassination scheme will be held accountable and criminally prosecuted.

Elected officials whose decisions directly and indirectly result in the commission of acts that would be considered crimes if committed by a regular person, are empowered to act by the voters who participated in their election – whether they voted for the winning or a losing candidate. Voters are aware at least peripherally that the policies of a candidate (or candidates) will almost certainly result in the commission of those criminal acts. A candidate, for example, can favor new or existing tough “law and order” policies that can be expected to result in the mistreatment or even death of a person who may only be suspected of a crime. Likewise, a candidate can support a foreign occupation, incursion, or war, during which innocent civilians will, or at a minimum can be expected to die, and destruction of property can be expected. The voters in an election are essential contributors to further, or even instigate the policies that result in those de facto criminal acts, since they can be the result of an elected officials effort to appease a large or otherwise influential voting block. Regardless of their egregiousness those acts are rarely recognized as criminal, because law enforcement agencies apply a much more lenient and forgiving standard of criminality to government officials, employees and contractors than is applied to other persons in society.

The harm to persons and destruction of property that occurs as a result of decisions by elected officials (politicians) don’t happen in a vacuum. Those decisions are only carried out because the elected officials(s) involved are considered to have the lawful authority to act that is bestowed by the people who voted both for and against them in the election. Even when those elected officials act in a way manifestly contrary to what they said during the election, the voters “own” the consequences of those actions when they don’t publicly disown the contrary action, or promptly do anything to remove or support removing that person from office. There are recall or impeachment procedures for elected public officials, including the president of the United States.

The law has a name for the relationship between voters and the elected person they empower to act who is involved in a manifestly criminal activity – an accessory.

Accessory to a crime, both before and after its commission is a legal concept that dates to at least English common law. An accessory is not present during a crime, but instigates, furthers, or contributes to the crime. An accessory after the crime assists or otherwise comforts those responsible for the crime. Under the federal (U.S.) law of accessory a principal actor doesn’t have to be charged for the accessory to be held criminally liable.

Consequently, based on the law of accessory, a voter can be considered an accessory to any crime committed under the auspices or direction of the winning candidate’s office. It is irrelevant that the elected office holder is not charged, and it is irrelevant that the voter selected a different candidate – because it is participation in the voting process that bestows authority for an elected official to act in the name of the people.

When an elected official is associated with the commission of an act identifiable as criminal, under the law of accessory to a crime, voters bear criminal responsibility for their participation in the election of the official(s), since their role as a voter instigated, furthered, or contributed to the commission of the crime. Only the people who did not vote have clean hands.

The people who voted for a re-elected official to whom criminal acts can be traced can be considered an accessory after the crime. That is true whether the person previously voted for the candidate, because their vote can be considered to provide comfort to the official. The caveat is the voter must have some basis to believe the crime had been committed, but that is a minimal standard, since publication of information related to the crime in sources such as the Congressional Record or a daily newspaper can be considered to provide lawful notice of an event.

Although to some people it may seem novel, and to others heresy that voters can bear criminal responsibility for the result of their participation is an election, those reactions are a result of the mystique that surrounds the voting process. However, the election of officials doesn’t suspend applicability of the criminal laws to their actions or the consequences of those actions, and the culpability of the voters who provided them with the opportunity to use their position to aid and abet the commission of acts that are in fact criminal.